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Semi-device-independent quantum protocols realize information tasks – e.g. secure key
distribution, random access coding, and randomness generation – in a scenario where no
assumption on the internal working of the devices used in the protocol is made, except
their dimension. These protocols offer two main advantages: first, their implementation
is often less demanding than fully-device-independent protocols. Second, they are more
secure than their device-dependent counterparts. Their classical analogous is represented
by random access codes, which provide a general framework for describing one-sided clas-
sical communication tasks. We discuss conditions under which detection inefficiencies can
be exploited by a malicious provider to fake the performance of semi-device-independent
quantum and classical protocols – and how to prevent it.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the distinguishing properties of quantum theory have been exploited to
accomplish tasks which are unfeasible in classical theory [1]. For example, protocols were
proposed for secure quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3], quantum teleportation [4, 5],
and quantum randomness generation (QRG) [6, 7]. With no exceptions, the first protocols
to be proposed were device dependent, namely their success critically relies on the agree-
ment between the description of the setup and its implementation. Since this hypothesis is
never exactly fulfilled, in experimental implementations a plethora of related problems arises.
In fact, the unavoidable mismatch between theoretical requirements of security proofs and
experimental implementations has recently been exploited to hack quantum cryptography
systems [8, 9, 10, 11].
Subsequently, fully-device-independent protocols were proposed, in a scenario where de-
vices are completely uncharacterized. Celebrated examples of device-independent protocols
include schemes for randomness generation [12, 13, 14] or secure quantum key distribu-
tion [15, 16, 17]. While first security proofs of these protocols were partial and required
some extra assumptions, such as, for instance, to assume that devices were memoryless, gen-
eral security proofs have recently been obtained in [18, 19]. Unfortunately, these security
proofs turn out to be quite demanding in terms of noise (in fact, the proof in [19] does not
tolerate any noise). Moreover, from an implementation point of view, device-independent pro-
tocols are quite challenging, as they require a detection-loophole-free Bell inequality violation
between two distant parties.
Recently, intermediate solutions between device-dependent and fully device-independent
protocols have been proposed. For example, in the so-called measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [20, 21], the measurement device is left uncharacterized. While offering a weaker
form of security than their device-independent counterparts, the implementation of MDI
protocols is much easier as they can tolerate higher losses and their performance is comparable
with that of standard schemes. Security of measurement-device-independent QKD protocols
under detection loophole hacks is discussed in Ref. [21], and experimental implementations
are reported in Refs. [22, 23].
Another example are the so-called semi-device-independent quantum protocols, where only
the dimension of the exchanged system is assumed while the devices are uncharacterized. At
the price of upper bounding the dimension of the system, secure QKD is possible [24] in
a measure and prepare scheme, and semi-device-independent protocols for QRG are also
known [25]. The importance of semi-device independent protocols relies on the fact that they
are secure against a wide class of attacks, where the eavesdropper can alter the characteristics
of systems and measurements, but can not change their dimensionality. For example, in the
attacks proposed in Refs. [8, 9, 11], by flashing bright light into the devices, an eavesdropper
gets control of detection efficiency for each measurement, but there is no way for him to make
the devices encode the information in a system of a higher dimensionality.
Semi-device-independent protocols are based on the quantum certification provided by
dimension witnesses for a fixed dimension [26]. While the recently developed formalism of
dimension witness [26, 27, 28] allows to lower bound the dimension of a system in a device-
independent fashion, a device-independent upper bound is prohibited by fundamental argu-
ments. Indeed, for any given system, no experiment is guaranteed to exploit all the available
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degrees of freedom. Then, only some a priori knowledge of the underlying physical model
can provide a (device dependent) upper bound on the dimension of the system. On the other
hand, it is worth to stress that in semi-device-independent protocols no additional assumption
on the model needs to be done. For example, for information encoded in the polarization of
a photon, only the unsurprising assumption that the system is two dimensional is required,
while no assumption is required on what the polarization directions are.
The classical analogous of semi-device-independent quantum protocols – namely, the case
in which the exchanged system is classical – is known as the problem of random access codes
(RACs) [29]. In the context of RACs, the aim of two distant parties is to optimally perform
some one-sided communication task under a constraint on the amount of classical information
exchanged.
Despite their security, real world implementations of semi-device-independent (quantum or
classical) protocols are subject to detection loophole (DL) attacks a– as happens for any fully-
device-independent protocol. In this attack, a malicious provider exploits non-ideal detection
efficiencies to skew the statistics of the experiment and ultimately faking its result. The aim
of this work is to provide conditions under which DL attacks are harmless in faking the result
of a semi-device-independent (quantum or classical) protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce DL attacks and present our main
results. In Sec. 3 we derive conditions under which DL attacks on semi-device-independent
quantum protocol are harmless, in the general framework where only the statistics of the
protocol is taken into account. In Sec. 4 we address the problem of the certification of semi-
device-independent classical protocols, in the framework of RACs. Finally we summarize our
results and delineate some further developments in Sec. 5.
2 Detection loophole attack
We start by presenting the general structure of the semi-device-independent (quantum and
classical) protocols considered in this work. The existing quantum protocols for QKD [24] and
QRG [25], as well as classical RACs, are examples of this structure. We consider protocols
in which two distant parties, Alice and Bob, have access to uncorrelated random number
generatorsb. For each round, we denote by j (i) the random variable generated by Alice’s
(Bob’s) generator and with qj (pi) its probability distribution. As said, these probability
distributions are independent. Random variables j and i represent the strategy that Alice
and Bob apply, respectively. This scheme is depicted in Fig. 1.
In each run, Alice and Bob get classical inputs a and b respectively. Alice sends a message
A – which may be classical or quantum – to Bob, who then returns a classical value B. Finally
they collect the statistics of several runs (the asymptotic case is always considered), obtaining
aThe problem of DL attack on semi-device-independent protocols shares analogies with that of the robustness
to loss of device-independent dimension witness (DIDWs) [26, 27, 28, 30], addressed in [31]. Nevertheless, while
in the former the task is to exploit non-ideal detection efficiencies to fake the result of a protocol producing
an input/output statistics which would be forbidden in the absence of DL, in the latter the task is to devise
conditions under which dimension witnessing is indeed possible even in the presence of loss.
bNotice that the assumption of uncorrelation is fulfilled by a broad class of protocols. Indeed, in any semi-
device-independent setup one necessarily has to assume that the devices are shielded – namely they can not
communicate except through message A. Then to have shared (classical or quantum) randomness one is
forced to introduce a trusted third party random generator, or to allow for infinite local memory on each
device storing previously distributed randomness.
4 Detection loophole attacks on semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols
Fig. 1. Scheme of a generic semi-device-independent (quantum or classical) protocol. Two distant
parties Alice and Bob are provided a black box each (bold-line boxes in the Figure). Alice’s and
Bob’s boxes receive classical input a and b respectively. Each box is allowed to use a classical
random generator (dashed-line boxes), which outcome – j for Alice’s box and i for Bob’s – is not
accessible to the parties but can influence the outcome of the box. Alice’s box sends a (quantum
or classical) message A to Bob, that finally outputs classical message B.
the conditional probability distribution P (B|a, b) of outcome B given inputs a and b, namely
P (B|a, b) :=
∑
i,j,A
piqjPi(B|A, b)Pj(A|a). (1)
It is important to stress that – as Eq. (1) clearly shows – access is granted only to the
inputs a, b and the output B, while no knowledge of the internal behavior of the black boxes
(including the random variables i, j) and of the message A is provided. The goal is to exploit
the correlations between the two parties, encapsulated by P (B|a, b) to solve an information
task, e.g. to distribute a secure key or generate random numbers.
When studying DL attacks, we assume that for each round of the experiment Alice or Bob
can claim that their “detector did not click”, and in this case this round of the experiment
is discarded from the statistics. In general, Alices box can decide whether to send state A
to Bob after receiving her input a and random variable j, while Bob’s box after receiving
his input b, the message A and random variable i. Thus, the detection efficiencies, i.e. the
probabilities that the detector clicks, are denoted with ηj(a) for Alice and ηi(A, b) for Bob.
Notice that these probabilities cannot be estimated as they depend on the variables i and j
internal to the devices. The conditional probability distribution of outcome B given inputs a
and b in the presence of a DL attack is given by
PDL(B|a, b) :=
∑
i,j,A piqjηi(A, b)ηj(a)Pi(B|A, b)Pj(A|a)∑
i,j,A piqjηi(A, b)ηj(a)Pj(A|a)
. (2)
We use the suffix DL whenever a distribution is obtained resorting to DL attack. Without
loss of generality, we are assuming that for every input a, b there is a non-zero probability of
click, namely denominator in Eq. (2) is strictly larger than 0 for any a and b. Indeed, if this
is not the case, namely if there exist a and b such that the corresponding probability of click
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is zero, one can discard their occurrences from the statistics without affecting the success of
the protocol.
Notice that whether Alice uses DL is not relevantc, since any settings she can prepare with
DL can also clearly be achieved without resorting to it, so Eq. (2) can be simplified as
PDL(B|a, b) =
∑
i,A piηi(A, b)Pi(B|A, b)P (A|a)∑
i,A piηi(A, b)P (A|a)
, (3)
where P (A|a) :=
∑
j qjηj(a)Pj(A|a)/
∑
j qjηj(a).
Independently of the task to be realized, all the known examples of semi-device-independent
quantum protocols are based on the quantum certification provided by dimension witnesses [26]
or, in other words, on the fact that, for a fixed dimension of the exchanged system A, there
are quantum distributions P (B|a, b) that cannot be attained when system A is classical - a
system is classical if the states in which it can be prepared are pairwise commuting. This
quantum certification plays here the same role as Bell violations for fully device-independent
protocols. Our purpose is then to understand how a DL attack can mimic correlations that
are intrinsically quantum exploiting the losses in the implementation. That is, rather than
analyzing the effect of losses for a given quantum protocol, we study situations in which the
observed correlations are useless for any quantum protocol. This is analogous to what is done
when studying the detection loophole for Bell inequalities.
On the other hand, for classical protocols such a general approach is obviously not pos-
sible. However, when addressing the problem of classical RACS, one is usually interested in
maximizing some figure of merit related to the particular communication task, such as the
worst case or average probability of correct detection. In this work we will focus on the former
- being the latter related by Yao’s principle [29, 32] – and we will devise conditions under
which it can not be improved resorting to DL attack.
3 Certification of semi-device-independent quantum protocols
In this Section, we focus on semi-device-independent quantum protocols, namely where the
exchanged system A is quantum. As mentioned, the success of semi-device-independent quan-
tum protocols depends on the generated statistics. Usually, for a given protocol, a large
enough value of a particular function of such statistics ensures the success of the protocol.
For instance, the protocol in [24] is secure only when it is assumed that the dimension of
the measured systems is two and a large value of a dimension witness is observed. Yet, in
general, a necessary condition for the successful performance of any protocol is the ability
to discriminate whether the source is intrinsically quantum or it can be described as a clas-
sical distribution, building only on the knowledge of the conditional probability distribution
P (B|a, b). That is, it is necessary to certify that the observed correlations cannot be explained
classically and, therefore, are potentially useful for quantum protocols without classical ana-
logue. The advantage of this approach is that it allows one to evaluate necessary conditions
cThis may be no more true if other constraints are introduced, since in this case the sets of distributions
P (A|a) and PDL(A|a) attainable by Alice can be different. For example, suppose that Alice is computationally
constrained to prepare message A in time polynomial in the size of a. On the one hand, without resorting to
DL it is impossible to obtain the distribution P (A|a) = δA,f(a), with f(a) some NP-hard function (as long
as we assume that P 6= NP ). On the other hand, exploiting DL Alice can randomly choose A and check in
polynomial time whether A = f(a), clicking only in this case.
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for security irrespectively of the particular protocol considered. Indeed, finding a DL attack
able to fake an intrinsically quantum distribution by exploiting detection inefficiencies makes
the observed correlations useless for any protocol. In this Section we provide conditions under
which DL attack can by no means recast a classical P (B|a, b) into an intrinsically quantum
PDL(B|a, b) thus faking the result of the protocol.
We say that a conditional probability distribution P (B|a, b) of outcome B given inputs a
on Alice’s side and b on Bob’s side admits a classical (quantum) d-dimensional model if it can
be written as
P (B|a, b) =
∑
A,i
piPi(B|A, b)P (A|a),
where ∑
A
P (A|a) = 1, ∀a,
∑
B
Pi(B|A, b) = 1, ∀A, b, i, (4)
P (A|a) ≥ 0 ∀A, a, Pi(B|A, b) ≥ 0 ∀B,A, b, i
for some probability pi and where A is a classical (quantum) d-dimensional system. Given
some correlations with losses, we say that DL attacks are harmless whenever there is no
classical attack faking the correlations.
The probability of click on Bob’s side given he received message A from Alice and input
b is given by
Q(B 6= NC|A, b) :=
∑
i
piηi(A, b),
where we denoted with NC the no-click event. The following Lemma shows that whenever
Q(B 6=NC|A, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b). (5)
then, DL attacks are harmless.
Lemma 1 If Q(B 6=NC|A, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b) for any A, b, then if PDL(B|a, b) does not admit
a d-dimensional classical (quantum) model then also P (B|a, b) does not admit a d-dimensional
classical (quantum) model.
Proof: First we show that under the hypothesis Q(B 6=NC|A, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b), if P (B|a, b)
admits a d-dimensional classical (quantum) model then also PDL(B|a, b) admits a d-dimensional
classical (quantum) model.
Let then us assume that P (B|A, b) admits a classical (quantum) model, namely it can be
written as
P (B|a, b) =
∑
A,i
piPi(B|A, b)P (A|a),
with Pi(B|A, b), P (A|a) satisfying Eq. (4) and for some probability pi. Then by definition
PDL(B|a, b) =
∑
i,A piηi(A, b)Pi(B|A, b)P (A|a)∑
i,A piηi(A, b)P (A|a)
.
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Upon introducing the hypothesis Q(B 6=NC|A, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b) one has
PDL(B|a, b) =
∑
i,A piηi(A, b)Pi(B|A, b)P (A|a)
Q(B 6=NC|b)
.
Upon setting
PDL(B|A, b) =
∑
i piηi(A, b)Pi(B|A, b)
Q(B 6=NC|b)
,
one clearly has
∑
B PDL(B|A, b) = 1 and PDL(B|A, b) ≥ 0 for any B,A, b. Then PDL(B|a, b)
admits the d-dimensional classical (quantum) model
PDL(B|a, b) =
∑
A
PDL(B|A, b)P (A|a).
Then, whenever PDL(B|a, b) does not admit a d-dimensional classical (quantum) model, also
P (B|a, b) does not.
At this point it is convenient to discuss condition (5) in relation with the so-called fair
sampling assumption. The latter states that the set of events in which the detectors clicked
is a randomly chosen sample from the total set of events that one would have obtained with
perfect detectors. That is,
PDL(B|a, b) = P (B|a, b). (6)
One can clearly see by using Eq. (3), that (5) does not necessarily imply the fair sam-
pling assumption. Indeed, in order to fulfill the fair sampling assumption for every choice
of {pi, P (A|a), Pi(B|A, b)}, one needs that ηi(A, b) = η(b). On the other hand, in order to
fulfill (5) for every function pi suffices that ηi(A, b) = ηi(b). In this sense, Lemma 1 generalizes
the fair sampling assumption, providing strictly weaker hypothesis under which DL-attacks
are harmless.
Nonetheless, the fair sampling assumption and our slightly more general condition (5) have
in common that they refer to properties of the internal working of the devices. In particular,
condition ηi(A, b) = ηi(b) – or the more constraining fair sampling assumption – cannot be
verified solely from the statistics, since the message A sent by Alice is not directly accessible
to the parties.
Next Proposition provides a much stronger condition for DL attacks to be harmless, as
it is stated only in terms of the probability Q(B 6=NC|a, b) of click given inputs a on Alice’s
side and b on Bob’s side, namely
Q(B 6=NC|a, b) :=
∑
i,A
piηi(A, b)P (A|a). (7)
Notice that this probability is accessible to the parties, being a function of the inputs a, b
which are in turn accessible. The following proposition shows that whenever statistics of
bidimensional systems fulfill
Q(B 6=NC|a, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b) (8)
DL-attacks are harmless.
8 Detection loophole attacks on semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols
Proposition 1 If Q(B 6=NC|a, b) = Q(B 6=NC|b) for any a, b, then if PDL(B|a, b) does not
admit a 2-dimensional classical model then also P (B|a, b) does not admit a 2-dimensional
classical model.
Proof: By hypothesis, for any input a0, a1 on Alice’s side one has∑
A
Q(B 6=NC|A, b) [P (A|a=a0)− P (A|a=a1)] = 0,
where the sum is over A = 0, 1.
Rearranging explicitly the terms in previous Equation and using the fact P (A = 1|a) =
1− P (A = 0|a) for any a, one obtains that either
P (A=0|a=a0) = P (A=0|a=a1),
for any a0, a1, namely the message A sent by Alice is independent on her input a, or
Q(B 6=NC|A=0, b) = Q(B 6=NC|A=1, b),
for any b, namely the detection probability on Bob’s side is independent on the message A
received from Alice.
In the former case P (B|a, b) clearly admits a classical local model, namely one in which
no message is sent from Alice to Bob, and the same holds true for PDL(B|a, b) due to Eq. (3).
In the latter case the hypothesis of Lemma 1 is satisfied, and thus the statement is proven.
As said, contrary to Lemma 1, this result is much stronger, as it is proven under an
assumption that can be verified only from the observed statistics. The price to pay is that it
only holds for systems of dimension two. Condition (8) is, therefore, highly inequivalent to (5)
or the fair sampling assumption. In fact, the attack presented in [8, 9] fulfills condition (8),
however clearly violates the fair sampling assumption (but also violates the assumption on
the dimension).
4 Certification of semi-device-independent classical protocols
In this Section, we focus on semi-device-independent classical protocols, namely where the
exchanged system A is classical. We devise functions of the input/output statistics that can
not be altered by DL attacks. Thus, any certification for semi-device-independent classical
protocols building only on the value of these functions will be immune to DL attacks. Again,
the main advantage is that, as above, these functions can be verified only from the observed
statistics.
A semi-device-independent classical protocol can be viewed as a random access code [33,
34] (RAC), and in the following it will be convenient to work in the framework of RACs. In
this framework, the aim of the two distant parties Alice and Bob is to optimally perform some
communication task by means of one-sided communication of classical information. RACs are
usually denoted with the notation n→ m. Here n is the number of input bits of Alice, namely
the dimension of input a is dim(a) = 2n, while m is the number of bits sent by Alice, namely
the dimension of message A is dim(A) = 2m (see Fig. 1).
In this scenario, the relevant figures of merit usually considered are the worst case or
the average success probability to have that B = f(a, b) for a specific Boolean function
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f(a, b) ∈ {0, 1}. Here we will focus on the former, being the latter related through Yao’s
principle [32]. The worst case probability of success Pwc is defined as
Pwc := min
a,b
P (B=f(a, b)|a, b).
The probability that B = f(a, b) with the DL attack is given by
PDL(B=f(a, b)|a, b) =
∑
i,A wi(A, a, b)Pi(B=f(a, b)|A, b)∑
i,A wi(A, a, b)
, (9)
where wi(A, a, b) = piηi(A, b)P (A|a) and the worst case probability that B = f(a, b) is given
by
PwcDL := min
a,b
PDL(B=f(a, b)|a, b).
The following Proposition provides conditions under which the worst case success prob-
ability of a RAC can not be increased resorting to DL exploit. When these hypotheses are
satisfied, a protocol relying on the worst case success probability may not be affected by DL
attack.
Proposition 2 Given a RAC, if the worst case success probability without resorting to DL at-
tack is Pwc=1/2, then the worst case probability of success resorting to DL attack is PwcDL=1/2.
Proof: The proof proceeds by absurd assuming Pwc = 1/2 and PwcDL > 1/2.
Equation (9) is the weighted sum over indices i and A of the numbers Pi(B = f(a, b)|A, b)
with weights wi(A, a, b)/
∑
i,A wi(A, a, b) and therefore is upper bounded by
PDL(B=f(a, b)|a, b) ≤ max
A,i
{Pi(B=f(a, b)|A, b)},
and one has
PwcDL ≤ min
a,b
max
A,i
{Pi(B=f(a, b)|A, b)}.
Since we are assuming PwcDL > 1/2 there exists a strategy i0 of Bob and a message A0
of Alice such that for all a, b one has Pi0 (B = f(a, b)|A0, b) > 1/2. Then Bob can exploit a
new strategy where he applies strategy i0 whenever he gets A0 and returns a random number
otherwise, for which the probability P˜ (B=f(a, b)|a, b) of B=f(a, b) given inputs a and b is
given by
P˜ (B=f(a, b)|a, b) =
[
Pi0(B=f(a, b)|A0, b)−
1
2
]
P (A0|a) +
1
2
.
This new strategy does not resort to DL and since Pi0(B = f(a, b)|A0, b) > 1/2 it has the
worst case success probability greater than
P˜wc = min
a,b
{P˜ (B=f(a, b)|a, b)} >
1
2
10 Detection loophole attacks on semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols
which contradicts the assumptions.
The following Corollary shows that for any n→ 1 RAC, DL attacks are harmless.
Corollary 1 For any n → 1 RAC the worst case success probability resorting to DL attack
is PwcDL=1/2.
Proof: In [35] it was shown that for any n → 1 RAC the hypothesis of Proposition 2 are
fulfilled, namely Pwc = 1/2, so the statement follows.
One may ask whether it is possible to relax the hypothesis of Proposition 2. We provide
here an example of RAC with worst case success probability larger than 1/2, and show that
this probability can be increased using DL attack. Consider the 3 → log 6 RAC. Alice is
given three independent bits a0, a1, a2, namely a = a0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ a2, and she can send to Bob
a 6-dimensional message or, equivalently, one bit A0 and one trit A1, namely A = A0 ⊗ A1.
Bob’s input is the trit b = 0, 1, 2 and the function to be computed is f(a, b) = ab. Here we
show that the worst case success probability Pwc without resorting to DL of 3→ log 6 RAC
is Pwc < 0.981, while there exists a DL attack such that the worst case success probability is
PwcDL = 1.
First, we prove that for the 3 → log 6 RAC one has Pwc < 0.981. An explicit upper
bound for the worst case quantum success probability – which is clearly at least as large as
the classical one Pwc – was derived in [36] in the context of quantum finite automata, namely
(1 − h(Pwc))n ≤ m,
where h(.) is the Shannon binary entropy function. Setting n = 3 and m = log 6 we get
Pwc < 0.981.
Now we provide a protocol using DL which achieves the worst case success probability
PwcDL = 1. The idea is to use part of the communicated message to distribute randomness.
Alice can choose the trit A1 at random and encode A0 = aA1 , in other words she sends one of
her bits randomly to Bob but also sends him information regarding which bit it is. If b = A1
then Bob returns B = A0 which is equal to ab. If b 6= A1 his detector does not click. The
detection efficiency of Bob’s device with this protocol is given by ηi(A, b) = δb,A1 , and the
worst case success probability is given by PwcDL = 1.
5 Conclusion
In this work we addressed the problem of how non-ideal detection efficiencies can be exploited
to fake the result of semi-device-independent quantum and classical protocols through DL
attacks.
For quantum protocols, we discussed general conditions under which DL attacks are harm-
less in terms of the detection probability. First, we proved in Lemma 1 that a sufficient con-
dition is that the measurements can be modeled as ideal ones affected by non ideal detection
efficiency - in terms of positive operator-valued measures (POVMs) [1], this means that the
element corresponding to no-click event is proportional to the identity. Perhaps surprisingly,
the “quantumness” of the generated statistics does not depend on the detection efficiency, as
far as this is strictly larger than zero, thus making our certification strategies extremely robust.
Unfortunately, this condition is not practical, as it requires some additional assumption on the
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model underlying the measurements. Then, we derived in Proposition 1 a sufficient condition
which is practical, namely it can be verified only from the knowledge of the input/output
statistics. Also in this case the certification is extremely robust, as it can be obtained for any
non-null value of the detection efficiency. Notice that, after the submission of this work, an
analogous result for device independent dimension witnessing with uncorrelated devices was
reported in Ref. [30]. There, indeed, it was shown that a particular dimension witness can
certify the quantumness of a qubit for any non-null value of the detection efficiency.
For classical protocols, we provided conditions under which DL attacks can not increase
the worst case success probability of a RAC. Our main results can be used as a guideline
to devise quantum and classical protocols resistant to DL attacks, being thus of relevance
for applications such as QKD, QRG, and RAC. Our approach for quantum protocols is very
general, providing necessary conditions for the quantum certification of the devices. A natural
follow-up question is to understand how DL attacks apply to specific examples of semi-device-
independent quantum and classical protocols.
Some of the presented results – namely Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 - hold in the hy-
pothesis that the message A sent by Alice is 2-dimensional. For the classical case, we showed
through the example 3→ log 6 RAC that this assumption can not be relaxed trivially. Thus,
it remains as an open problem how to devise more general conditions under which DL attacks
are harmless.
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